ABSTRACT
Aviation is a phenomenon which every country is conversant with. Since countries must interact with one another, and movement between countries is made by air, the maintenance of reliable aviation authorities is considered imperative. Hence, this study sets out to investigate the managerial problems of the Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA – The regulatory body of the Nigerian Aviation Industry), and present a framework which can be adopted for a better management of the industry. It is therefore focused on a systems analysis of NCAA. The descriptive survey design was adopted for the study, whereby data were collected through the use of questionnaire and secondary sources such as textbooks, journals, newspapers and articles from NCAA. The proportional stratified sampling technique was used for the selection of respondents. Two hundred and fifty – six copies of the questionnaire were distributed. Based on two hundred and forty copies returned, data were analysed, using Chi – square and Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) at the 0.05 level of significance. Findings from the study reveal that there is a significant relationship between the integration among the component systems within NCAA and low performance. There is no relationship between the surveillance capacity of NCAA and low performance. Also revealed by the study is that the control system in NCAA has an adverse effect on its overall performance. Finally, the study showed that the available network of information is both inadequate and unreliable, thus making effective control a near illusion. Inadequate information, aggravated by poor radar coverage, has remained the main reason behind NCAA’s inability to maintain effective control of airlines and parastatals. The recommendations made for better performance include merging of airlines, undisputed adherence to the rules and regulations of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and the International Air Transport Association (IATA), provision of adequate radar coverage, and others.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Title Page – – – – – – – – – i
Approval – – – – – – – – – ii
Certification – – – – – – – – – iii
Dedication – – – – – – – – – iv
Acknowledgments – – – – – – – – v
Abstract – – – – – – – – – vii
Table of Contents – – – – – – viii
List of Tables – – – – – – – – xi
List of Figures – – – – – – – – xii
Appendices – – – – – – – xiv
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
- Background of the Study – – – – – – 1
- Brief History of NCAA – – – – – 5
- Statement of Research Problem – – – – 7
- Objectives of the Study – – – – – 8
- Research Questions – – – – 8
- Hypotheses – – – – – – 9
- Scope of the Study – – – – – – 9
- Limitations of the Study – – – – 10
- Significance of the Study – – – – – 11
References – – – – – – – – 15
CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
- Introduction – – – – – – – – 18
- Observed/Recorded Lapses in the Aviation Sector – 18
- Perceiving Aviation from a Systems Perspective – 29
2.3.1 Organizations as Systems – – – – – – 34
- The Concept of Management – – – – – 53
- Organizations as Open Systems – – – – – 61
- Characteristics of Open Systems – – – – – 68
- Organizations as Cybernetic Systems – – – – 69
- Situation Awareness in Aviation – – – – – 73
- Concept of a Cybernetic System – – – – – 75
- A Descriptive Analysis of NCAA – – – – – 77
- Control as a Feedback System – – – – – 81
- Bad Management – – – – – – – 83
- Symptoms of Bad Management – – – – – 84
- Causes of Bad Management in Nigerian Organizations – 84
- Solving Problems of Bad Management – – – – 87
References – – – – – – – – 89
CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.0 Introduction – – – – – – – – 98
3.1 Research Design – – – – – – – 98
3.2 Sources of Data – – – – – – – 99
3.2.1 Primary sources – – – – – – – 99
3.2.2 Secondary Sources – – – – – 100
3.3 Study Population – – – – – 100
3.4 Sample Size Determination – – – 101
3.5 Research Instruments – – – – 102
3.6 Sample Selection Method – – – – 102
3.7 Method of Data Analysis – – – – – 104
3.8 Validity and Reliability of Test Instruments – 104
References – – – – – – 106
CHAPTER FOUR: PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA
- Introduction – – – – – – – – 107
- Presentation of Data – – – 107
- Responses of the Respondents – – 112
- Testing of Hypotheses – – – 145
CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSIONS ON FINDINGS
- Introduction – – – – – – – – 157
- Relationship between Level of Integration among Component
Parts within NCAA and Low Performance – – – 157
- Relationship between the Surveillance Capacity of NCAA and
Low Performance – – – – – – – 158
- Relationship between NCAA’s Control Capacity and Low Performance – – – – – – – – 159
- Relationship between Control Problems and Communication
within NCAA – – – – – – – 161
References – – – – – – – – 164
CHAPTER SIX: SUMMARY, FINDINGS, CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATION
- Summary of Research – – – – – – 166
- Summary of Findings – – – 167
- Conclusion – – – – – – 167
- Contribution to Knowledge – – – 168
- Recommendations – – – – – 168
Bibliography – – – – – – – – 171
Appendix – – – – – – – – 182
LIST OF TABLES
Table 2.1 Catalogue of Air Tragedies in Nigeria – – – – 27
Table 4.4.1 Contingency Table for Respondents’ Opinion on the
Effectiveness of NCAA’s Surveillance Capacity – 150
Table 4.4.3 Contingency Table for the Control and Performance
Problem – – – – 153
Table 4.4.4. Revised Cross Classification Table – – – 153
Table 4.4.5 Contingency Table for the Communication and Control
Problem – – – – – 155
LIST OF FIGURES
Fig. 2.1 The Reason Model – – – – – – 19
Fig. 2.2 Organisational Indictors of Safety Culture – – – 20
Fig. 2.3 Cynefin Framework of Contextual Complexity – – 31
Fig. 2.4 The Onion Concept – – – – – – 32
Fig. 2.5 Product Layout – – – 35
Fig. 2.6 Effect of Goal Difficulty on Performance – – 40
Fig. 2.7 Intergroup Management Strategies – 42
Fig. 2.8 Types of Business Environment – – – – 46
Fig. 2.9 The Direct – Action and Indirect – Action Environments
of an Organization – – – – – – 47
Fig. 2.10 Management as a Process – – – – – 54
Fig. 2.11 The Basic Elements of a System – – – – 62
Fig. 2.12 Open Systems View of Organizations – – – 65
Fig. 2.13 Threat Matrix – – – – – – 67
Fig. 2.14 Abstract Model of a Cybernetic System – – – 69
Fig. 2.15 Relationship between Information and Entropy – 72
Fig. 2.16 An Abstract Model of a Cybernetic System – – 76
Fig. 2.17 Model of NCAA as a Cybernetic System – – 77
Fig. 2.18 Feedback Loop of Management Control – – – 81
Fig. 2.19 Simple Feedback – – – – – – 82
Fig. 4.1 Survey Result from Table 4.2.2 – – 109
Fig. 4.2 Survey Result from Table 4.2.3 – – 110
Fig. 4.3 Survey Result from Table 4.3.7 – 117
Fig. 4.4 Survey Result from Table 4.3.10 – – 119
Fig. 4.5 Survey Result from Table 4.3.11 – – 121
Fig. 4.6 Regions of Rejection and Non Rejection for the Analysis
of Variance at the 5% Level of Significance with 3 and 24
Degree of Freedom – – – – – – 147
Fig. 4.7 Determination of the Critical Value of Chi-Square at the
.05 Level of Significance with Degrees of Freedom – 149
Fig. 4.8 Determination of the Acceptance and Rejection Regions
for Chi-square at the 0.05 Level of Significance with 12
Degrees of Freedom – – – – – 152
Fig. 4.9 Determination of the Critical Value of Chi-square at the
.05 Level of Significance with 3 Degrees of Freedom – 155
APPENDICES
Appendix 1: University of Nigeria, Enugu Campus – 182
Appendix 2: Calculation of the Coefficient of Correlation to Determine
the Validity of Instrument — – – – – 188
Appendix 3: Calculation of the Coefficient of Correlation to Determine
Reliability of Instrument – – – – – 190
Appendix 4a: Respondents’ Opinion on the Level of Interaction among the
Component Systems within NCAA Groups – 192
Appendix 4b: Computation of Total Sum of Squares, TSS — 193
Appendix 4c: Computation of within Group Variation – – 194
Appendix 5a: Calculation of Theoretical Frequencies – 196
Appendix 5b: Computation of Chi-Square Test Statistic for Surveillance
Capacity of NCAA – – – – – – 196
Appendix 6a: Calculation of Theoretical Frequencies – 197
Appendix 6b: Computation of Chi-Square Test Statistic for the Control
and Performance Problem – – – – – 198
Appendix 7a: Calculation of Theoretical Frequencies – 199
Appendix 7b: Computation of Chi-Square Test Statistic for Communication in NCAA – – – 199
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY
Incessant air mishaps have paved way for concern over air safety. These mishaps in turn, have been aggravated by poor airport safety and security. To maintain a reputable safety culture, proper crew selection and training must be guaranteed. Ofojebe (2007:15) explains that the ultimate success or failure of an organization is attributed to the efforts of all the
organization clearly depends on the collective performance of its individual administrators. Ude (1990:44) states clearly that most of the problems confronting organizations in Nigeria are management related.
A statistics released by Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria (FAAN) in February 2006 showed that, with respect to international passenger movement, a total of 114,950 was recorded for passengers coming into the country from the West Africa sub-region and other parts of Africa as opposed to 245, 200 recorded in the previous year. Mail movement at the airport also experienced a sharp drop-in patronage. At the Murtala Muhammed airport Lagos, mail tonnage dropped by 308.116kg within six months. (September, 2005 to February, 2006). At the Aminu Kano International Airport, cargo movement dropped from 17,828,621 to 15,246,173 within 6 months.
Internal Reports available show that the Nigerian aviation sector is poorly rated in terms of safety. This is attributed to the very many air tragedies that occurred in the country’s airspace. For example, in
December 2005, a damning report of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) of the United States of America (USA) revealed faults in 16 Nigerian Aircrafts. The report, which led to the grounding of the Boeing 737 (100, 200 and 200C series) aircraft, alleged faults in the model. In his work, Oladede (2006:2) argues that Nigeria has not been a reference in the air transport industry in Africa”.
Annan (2006:2) expressed bitterly what many in the international circles called “frustration” on the part of international agencies and companies whose staff and agencies use Nigerian airlines. According to him, “the series of crashes and attendant devastating losses call for a critical review of the aviation sector”. Reacting to the incessant crashes, Onyekakeyah (2005:65) regrets that in the aviation sector, we are reaping sorrow and anguish by the waste of precious lives through air disasters.
Chikwe (2005:25) emphasizes that most of the aircraft on the fleet of private airlines were manufactured in 1968, while just a few were manufactured in 1976, used by the countries which produce them, and phased out after their stipulated life span. Moreover, the Western and American countries have since legislated against the flying of old aircraft Ore (2006:12) maintains that the nation’s airports are in a progressive state of decay, signposted by either outdated, or inadequate facilities, and inept management. Reacting to the ADC air crash of 2006, which claimed the lives of all 116 passengers on board, Akintola (2006:1) points out that the Nigerian aviation industry needs urgent overhaul.
Sequel to the chain of air crashes which occurred between 2005 and 2006 – (The Bellview Airline in which 117 persons lost their lives in 2005; Sosoliso Airlines in December 2005, involving loss of lives to the tune of 108 persons, including 60 secondary school students; Two ADC – owned Boeing 737 aircrafts which claimed the lives of 117 and 96 persons respectively), the managing director of the National Emergency Management Agency, NEMA, Captain Iyayi revealed that there are just two serviceable radar in the country, and that the others are obsolete (installed in the 70’s). Reacting to the ADC air crash of Oct. 2006, the Minister of Federal Capital Territory, Malam Nasir el-Rufai, told a foreign medium in Sokoto (Nov. 2006) that the condition of the ADC plane was “deplorable”, with “bad tyres”
After the Bellview crash of October 22nd 2005, the National Emergency Control Agency (NEMA) was unable to decode the exact location of the plane. It is unfortunate that most airlines still use the old model radio signal technically termed Beacon 121.5 rather than the modern Beacon 406.
As regards the Agency’s inability to read any signal from the Bellview airline, Fagbemi (2005:68) asserts that it was as a result of the old model radio signal which just could not be read by the facilities of the National Emergency Management Agency. According to him, the beacon might have busted before the aircraft crashed.
The NEMA satellite was unable to detect the location of the crashed aircraft because it had an old model beacon. The satellite network can only use 406 MHz for distress alert. “In Nigeria, about 99 per cent of the distress alerts are false. False alerts can be resolved quickly with 406 MHz beacons as they transmit a digital signal that can identify owner” (Fagbemi, 2005:64). The 121.5 MHz beacon used by the Bellview Airline is based on obsolete analogue technology.
In its review of the global events of 2004, the National Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 2005 World Disasters Report, remarked that many of the year’s disasters could have been avoided with better information and communication.
Ore (2005) posits that our airports are facing deficiencies in the area of security. Describing the Nigerian Airspace, Onasanya (2005:12) points out that our airspace was blacklisted by the International Federation of Airline Pilots (IFALPA) as lacking in effective communications, navigation, surveillance and air traffic management facilities, services and procedure. In simple terms, there was no VHF (radio) coverage of the national airspace, the navigational and landing aids were not functional most of the time, the radar stations were broken down and air traffic control services were not provided to en-route traffic.
Still on the ADC crash, the “Guardian” reported that the official response to the emergency was poor and slow, and that the management of information was even worse. It went further to point out that the aviation ministry has been keeping mute about numerous recommendations made by stakeholders and committees set up by government since the Bellview incident. Stakeholders and experts have emphasized that the only way to check frequent air mishaps is maintenance, repair and overhaul of fleet by airlines.
On the Sosoliso crash, the Nigerian Accident Investigation Prevention Bureau (AIPB) reported that the country needs an efficient national emergency agency to carry out prompt search and rescue operations.
Also highlighted was the relevance of an effective weather forecasting and monitoring infrastructure, which makes for a safer airspace.
In the words of Shadare (2006:52): “Nigeria’s air safety record is appalling, as the airspace is regarded as one of the most dangerous, making nonsense of whatever reforms the government had embarked on”. According to Okon (1995:1), Nigerians should stop paying lip service to urgent services like aviation, an industry we cannot afford to operate below standards.
Reports of the presidential task force which was set up in 2006 to look into the decay in the aviation sector, revealed that all the airports in the country lack basic operational facilities that could make for smooth operations of modern airports. The decay in facilities was attributed to long years of neglect and corruption.
1.2 BRIEF HISTORY OF NCAA