THE EFFECT OF BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA SOCIETY
The purpose of this study is to understand to what extent The Effect of Bribery and Corruption in Nigeria Society in using a qualitative case study design. This thesis argues that corruption leads to a concentration of wealth among a minority of elite government officials, resulting in extensive deficiency of social welfare. In addition, corruption has secondary and tertiary effects throughout society that further exacerbate social welfare conditions.For this study, social welfare is measured by a comprehensive range of social indicators including but not limited to: level of poverty, income inequality, level of infrastructure, and health. Corruption can only be measured by the sole available gauge of corruption to date: Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. Research limitations regarding the conceptualization of corruption as well as complexities in defining and measuring social welfare are also addressed. This study concludes that corruption is a significant factor contributing to poor social welfare in Nigeria, resulting in nothing short of a protracted human tragedy.
Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa and the eighth most populous country in the world with more than 155 million people (World Bank Country Brief 2011). The United Nation’s Department of Economic and Social Affairs projects Nigeria’s population to reach 389 million by 2050 (U.N. Population Division 2011). Nigeria is larger territorially than the American states of Texas and Utah combined, with over 355,000 square miles. But Nigeria’s unique legacy of British colonialism has left it with an overabundance of political, social and economic issues, including only relatively recently becoming a sovereign country. Most scholars associate Nigeria’s contemporary problems with this aspect of its historical narrative. Nigeria consists of over 250 different ethnic groups, languages, and diverse cultures. Since nationhood in Nigeria is a recently contrived phenomenon, literature on Nigeria holds that many Nigerians still identify primarily by ethnicity instead of nationality. Loyalty is naturally to kin and community first, and to the nation thereafter. Disunity is common in countries that are constructed externally, by imperial powers, and can lead to disintegration, as occurred with the former Yugoslavia. This is because the forging of national unity is not typically a process that can successfully be imposed against one’s will. Where it has occurred naturally, national unity has developed gradually over time. Although there are many negative modern effects associated with nationalism, it is commonly recognized as the element that creates cohesion within a society. The inability of Nigerian society to coalesce, caused in part by its postcolonial history, is a source of the worsening economic and social tragedy facing Nigeria over the last half a century (Adebanwi and Obadare 2010).
Another divisive facet of Nigerian society discussed in the literature pertains to religion.
Islam spread into Northern Nigeria in the mid-1500s. Europeans later brought Christianity to the South through religious missions, creating religious divisions within the country that persist to this day. Because of its massive population, Nigeria has more Muslims than any other country in Africa or the Arab world (Hoch 2003). Under colonial rule, Shari’a law was permitted, except for amputations and executions, but Shari’a was suspended after independence so as not to provoke religious tensions between the North and the South (Hoch 2003). In 2000 several predominantly Muslims states in Northern Nigeria re-implemented Shari’a law, prompting fear in the South that the law would eventually be forced upon them (though Islamic law is only applicable to Muslims). Religious tensions between Muslims and Christians have been increasing on an international scale since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the ensuing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which may further exacerbate internal divisions between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria. Islamic fundamentalist groups have been proliferating in the last few decades, attempting to rally Muslims worldwide to their cause. Nigeria made headlines when one of its prominent young Muslim citizens from Kaduna State, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, attempted to detonate plastic explosives on Christmas day aboard a Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam to the United States in 2009. Some Nigerians claim the reemergence of Shari’a law is a response to corruption and crime; in particular, armed robbery caused by the increasing disparity between the rich and poor (Hoch 2003). Such trends demonstrate how the breakdown of certain aspects of society (income equality, in this case) can negatively influence other areas (equality’s effect on crime). Inequality then becomes another divisive facet of Nigerian society, creating tensions between the haves and have nots, most of whom fall into the latter category.
Despite these many challenges, Nigeria has been blessed (or to some, cursed) with one of the world’s most in demand natural resources: oil. Nigeria is currently the fourteenth largest exporter of crude oil in the world and the largest in Africa, producing more than 2.2 million barrels of petroleum per day in 2009 (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2009). This combination of copious natural resources and population has earned it the nickname ‘Africa’s Giant’. Even though Nigeria has only a mono-economy (an economy based principally on one product, oil in Nigeria’s case), its abundant endowment of natural resources earned it 41st place out of 181 countries in a 2010 ranking of the world’s highest Gross Domestic Product’s (GDP) by country (IMF World Economic Database 2011).
Yet the citizens of Nigeria remain among the poorest in the world, with an estimated 64 percent living below the poverty line ($1.25 per day) between 1994 and 2008 (UNICEF 2010). When viewing poverty data at the subnational level some measures were as high as 96 percent, as in Ekiti State in 2004 (Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics 2010). A World Bank report (2006) listed Nigeria as the second poorest country in the world (only Ethiopia was poorer) according to 2000 per capita wealth. While the data varies slightly depending on the source and date of measure, there is no question that the quality of life for the average Nigerian is far less than what it could be. Despite trillions in oil revenues received over even just the last two decades, Nigeria still remains a developing country. What is the explanation for this enormous discrepancy between national wealth and individual wealth in Nigeria? Public revenues intended for development and maintenance of national infrastructure have instead been used for private gain to the detriment of Nigerian society.
Over the last several hundred years, human society has made progress in a number of areas. We can travel faster, communicate instantly, live longer, and easily cure diseases (such as the bubonic plague) that previously killed millions of people. More recently, with the controversial rise of the welfare state, the role of government in providing for the basic needs of its people has increased. In addition to national defense and the rule of law, many governments provide basic healthcare, low income housing, food programs, and set a minimum wage for labor, in addition to many other federal, state, county, and municipal services. However, some governments are falling far short of meeting even the most basic needs of their people, such as education, access to clean water, healthcare, and electricity. A government that has the ability to meet the needs of its people, but fails to do so compromises its legitimacy. Failure to provide basic services to such a massive population can lead to a humanitarian crisis, as can be argued in Nigeria’s case. An inexperienced Western perspective may naively assume that most people have access to the same basic services that are available in an advanced industrialized society, but the social welfare of Nigerians has actually decreased despite the hundreds of billions in oil revenues that the Nigerian Government acquires each year. “The brazen display of wealth by public officials, which they are unable to explain the source, points to how bad corruption has reached in the society” (Uslaner 2008, 198). Nigeria’s social welfare tragedy is due, in large part, to persistent corruption within all levels of government. The purpose of this study is, therefore, to explore this tragedy, and how it has hampered Nigerian social welfare. A key argument is that endemic corruption is largely at fault.
SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH
Research regarding the impact of corruption on social welfare in Nigeria is significant primarily for three reasons. First, existing literature tends to focus on the causes of corruption rather than the effects. Although it is common practice to find solutions to problems by locating their origins, focusing too heavily on the causes of corruption in Nigeria can overshadow the real tragedy, which is its impact on the social welfare of Nigerians. Despite a brief overview of the causes of corruption, the focus of this study is on the consequences, for several reasons. Emphasizing the consequences of corruption helps circumvent, to some extent, disputes regarding causes of corruption, which often lose sight of the purpose of corruption research, which is to swiftly find solutions. The longer the crisis is allowed to persist, the more victims it claims. Existing studies also do not seem to differentiate between corruption and other forms of corruption. Some forms of corruption may have more harmful effects on society than others. Corruption involves far greater sums of money and is limited to high level officials, so focusing on this form of corruption first may be less challenging and provide greater benefits in the short term. Reducing corruption first may also create more economic opportunities in society, reducing the overall need for corruption at lower levels. Some of the extant research on corruption does study its negative effect on economic development, but has yet to specifically relate corruption with exceedingly deficient social welfare, which is the purpose of this study. Thus, this study supplements the existing literature.
Addressing the link between corruption and social welfare is also a necessary and critical first step to resolving one of the many causes of global poverty, given that a key measure of social welfare is level of poverty. Despite the awareness of the previous associations between corruption and economic development, the ubiquitous studies of it over decades, the creation of international and domestic anti-corruption laws, and powerful international organizations to combat it, corruption in Nigeria not only persists, but is perceived to be increasing according to Transparency International’s most recent corruption data (Transparency.org 2011). Thus, the existing research on corruption and economic development has failed to be a sufficient deterrent of corruption. By accentuating the connection between corruption and its dire consequences for social welfare, this study hopes to encourage a more urgent response to corruption, both in Nigeria and the international community, foremost among political leaders, but also by Nigerian citizens, who often have more political power than they realize.
Second, by keeping corruption in the international discourse pressure is maintained on the Nigerian government to continue working towards a solution. Nigeria, like every country, values its reputation within the international community. International relations are critical for trade and security in the contemporary globalized environment. Nigeria is a member of the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the British Commonwealth. The more corrupt Nigeria is perceived to be, the less willing foreign investors and international donors are to invest or provide assistance. Smith cites the title of a 1995 television program, “Not in Our Character: Enough is Enough in this Calculated Attempt to Smear Our Image as a People and Nation”, aired by the Nigerian government in response to a 60 Minutes broadcast entitled “Corruption, Inc.” earlier that year as evidence of the importance of Nigeria’s reputation within the international community (Smith 2007, 53). Although detailed information on the program could not be located, the title implies a public campaign by the government to challenge international misperceptions of Nigeria and its citizens.
Pressure on world governments since Nigeria’s democratization in 1999 has resulted in Nigeria’s first genuine anti-corruption efforts since independence. In 2002, then U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair called for an Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) to promote more transparency in the extractive industries (specifically oil, gas, and mining) worldwide. The EITI Association operates under Norwegian law as a non-profit organization. The first conference was held in June 2003, with two Nigerian delegates in attendance: Ombu C. Harry, the Group Executive Director of Finance and Accounts for the Nigerian National Petroleum Company, and Dr. Christopher Kolade, the Nigeria High Commissioner for London. Overall, 140 delegates from 70 governments, companies, industry groups, international organizations, investors, and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) attended. Attendees committed to an action plan on fighting corruption and increasing transparency.
On the basis that transparency inhibits corruption and promotes good governance, and that strengthened enforcement efforts against bribery and corruption will lead to integrity in government decision-making, some of the initiatives that EITI’s action plan calls for include: improving public financial management and accountability, efforts for greater capacity building by developing countries, requiring fiduciary assessments prior to providing development assistance, making such assessments public, full disclosure of multilateral development bank performance allocation systems, implementation of existing commitments by countries worldwide in regional and international conventions on corruption through anti-corruption action plans, strengthened enforcement of anti-bribery laws, denying safe haven to public officials guilty of corruption, due diligence of financial institutions to establish procedures and controls for detecting and reporting transactions that may involve proceeds of foreign official corruption, reform banking sectors to comply with Financial Action Task Force recommendations, and full disclosure by government and companies involved in extractive sectors (oil, gas, and mining) of revenue flows, payments from the extractive sectors, expenditures, and procurement transactions to a third party such as the IMF, World Bank, or Multilateral Development Bank (EITI 2003). In 2007, Nigeria passed NEITI, the Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative, becoming one of only ten countries with a compliance status by 2009.
Thirdly, research on corruption in Nigeria is significant because natural resources are finite. Nigeria has approximately 36 billion recoverable barrels of known oil reserves (U.S. Energy Information Association-Reserves 2009). At a daily production rate of 2.2 million barrels per day, Nigeria has 16,381days (or 44 years) of oil remaining, if production continues at the current rate. Although that is still a substantial amount of incoming future oil revenue, it is possible for natural resources to eventually become exhausted. Not to mention ongoing efforts by the international community to reduce dependence on foreign oil and develop sustainable energy resources. The majority of Nigeria’s oil is exported to Europe and the United States. If the price of oil should collapse (as it did in the 1980s depressing Nigeria’s economy even further) or if Nigeria’s natural resources run out, Nigeria will need a diversified, strong economy to fall back on. The sooner corruption can be mitigated and the oil revenues used to strengthen the nonoil economic sectors and modernize infrastructure, the better Nigeria’s future prospects will be. Nigeria’s former Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) Chairman, Nuhu Ribadu, notes that the known funds stolen from Nigeria due to corruption since 1960 exceed $440 billion or “six times the Marshall Plan,” which rebuilt nearly the entire war ravaged continent of Europe after World War II (Ribadu 2009, 4). Clearly the funds exist to drastically improve social welfare in Nigeria and time is a critical factor.
While this thesis seeks to focus on the effects of corruption rather than the causes, as stated previously, corruption cannot be understood in Nigeria without first placing it into the appropriate historical context. Historical context is essential because Nigeria’s historical trajectory has significantly influenced the country that Nigeria has become today. This analysis of corruption in Nigeria focuses on the postcolonial era, but emphasizes contemporary social welfare, drawing on historical periods since 1960 only for purposes of comparison.
The roots of corruption in Nigeria are generally agreed to have emanated from Nigeria’s history of colonization. Prior to colonization, the territory that now comprises the state of Nigeria was made up of more than 250 different tribes, clans, and social groups (U.S. Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs 2011). These discrete entities had their own customs, organization, and social functioning. Europeans first came to Nigeria as slave traders. Eventually Britain outlawed the practice and companies began trading in agricultural goods. During the 19th century, the British government took control of relations between British trading companies and various ethnic groups in Nigeria, creating both a Northern and a Southern ‘protectorate’. In 1914, Britain formally declared the territory a colony, naming it Nigeria and it remained so until October 1, 1960 (Figure 6). Shortly before regaining independence, the British government designed a federalist form of democratic government around ethnic territorial divisions, as the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group was dominant in the North, while the Igbo inahbited in the East, and the Yoruba resided in the West (Figure 5: Ethnic Regions of Nigeria). The federalist system was initially designed to give substantial autonomy to the South while retaining federal power in the North. Democratic institutional foundations did not have sufficient time to solidly develop in the four years between independence and Nigeria’s first democratic elections.
The failure of this to occur in recent democracies has been found to have consequences for income inequality (Chang 2007). Under the strain of preexisting ethnic tensions, the South split into two regions (East and West) just prior to independence.
It was not long before further tensions arose over the power structure and the nation experienced its first military coups in 1966, three in just one year. Shortly thereafter, the oil-rich, Southeastern area of Biafra attempted to secede in 1967, resulting in a three year war and millions of casualties. The federal government slowly concentrated power in the North, creating more states in order to weaken the Eastern and Western regions. By the time the most recent democratic republic was established in 1999, Nigeria had gone from 3 semi-autonomous regions to 36 subnational states. Successive military coups took place in 1975, 1983 and 1985. A failed coup occurred in 1990, and in 1993 the much anticipated transition to a civilian government was unsuccessful. Nigeria’s Third Republic was established in 1999, returning the country once more to democratic rule; however, thirty one years of the country’s independence was spent under military rule (Table 1: Chronology of Regimes since Independence).
Structure of government is significant because military dictatorships are not as accountable (if at all) to their citizens since rulers cannot be voted out of office. Dictators either hand over power voluntarily or are forced out in coup by a more powerful group. Without accountability, governments have free reign to do as they please, and history proves that they will abuse their power if given the chance. The historian and moralist John Emerich Edward Dalberg Acton responded to Pope Pius IX’s Doctrine of Papal Infallibility in an April 1887 letter to a church bishop stating: “all power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great men are almost always bad men even when they exercise influence and not authority: still more when you superadd the tendency or certainty of corruption by full authority. There is no worse heresy than that the office sanctifies the holder of it” (Dalhberg-Acton 1949, 364). Military dictatorships have far more power than democracies, where there is a balance of power evenly distributed between branches of government for the explicit purpose of discouraging corrupt behavior. That is not to say corruption does not exist in a democracy, only that it exists to a far less detrimental degree. In true democracies, citizens are given a voice through their ability to participate, if they so choose. Elections since Nigeria transitioned to democracy have lacked credibility, until the 2011 elections, which were monitored by international observers and have been hitherto deemed legitimate. The legitimacy of elections is critical since illegitimate elections in Nigeria have resulted in military coups, prolonging military rule.
For example, in 1964 Nigeria held its first federal elections since independence. The elections were perceived as rigged and boycotted by the major alliance of Southern parties (Anglin 1965). The existing Prime Minister (appointed in 1960), Abubakar Balewa, was nevertheless elected. Balewa, from Bauchi State in central Northern Nigeria, was assassinated only two years later during the country’s first military coup. Political parties were then disbanded by governmental decree (Joseph 1987). General Aguiyi JT Ironsi from the Southeastern region became Head of State for the next six months, until his own assassination by opposition elements from the North. General Yakubu Gowon, a Northerner from Plateau State, became the next military Head of State and “the commitment to rid the nation of corrupt use of public office [by Gowon] gave way…to corruption on a grand scale in Nigeria” (Joseph 1987, 72). Gowon’s “unwillingness to discipline his subordinates, to shuffle his cabinet,…and to respond positively to the charges and information with which he was inundated concerning the malfeasance and arbitrary conduct of his chief subalterns, the military governors in twelve states” signifies the weakness of leadership that allowed corruption to flourish during Gowon’s nine year rule (Joseph 1987, 72). President Shagari was elected after a transition back to democracy in 1979 and re-elected in 1983, but the vote was alleged to have been rigged (Hart 1993). After unsuccessful contestation in court, the military overthrew Shagari, beginning another long period of military rule in Nigeria. Although Nigeria is now a democracy, the presidential-style system is still imperialistic in that it lacks a system of checks and balances that leaves the president with the majority of power. There are corruption charges pending against government ministers and occasionally state governors, but a sitting Head of State has never been charged or accused of corruption despite the almost certainty that corruption still exists at this level. Although corruption is technically against Nigerian law, there is no enforcement at the highest government levels. A legislative and judicial branch both exist within the Nigerian Government, yet power checks against the executive branch rarely occur. The Nigerian Government still lacks full accountability at the highest levels. Thus, the colonization imposed on Nigeria resulted in a historical trajectory of ethnic rivalry, military rule, and corruption that has implications for Nigeria’s status today.
Prior to the discovery of oil in 1956 by Royal Dutch Shell (a merger between British based Shell Transport and Trading Company and Royal Dutch Petroleum Company in the East Indies in 1907), Nigeria was primarily an agriculturally based economy trading in palm oil, timber, and other commodities (U.S. Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs 2011). In 1960, agricultural products such as palm oil and cacao beans made up nearly all Nigeria’s exports
(O’Neil 2007). In 1965, shortly after independence but prior to the civil war, oil exportation in Nigeria was still in its infancy, accounting for only 5 percent of government revenues. The nationalization of the oil industry by the government in the 1970s steadily increased its percentage of oil company shares to 35 percent in 1973, 55 percent in 1974, 60 percent in mid1979, and 80 percent by August 1979 (Shell.com 2011). Today, Shell maintains that the Nigerian government receives 95 percent of the revenue (after costs) – nearly $35 billion since 2006 – from the joint venture with Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, whose operations include 90 oil fields, 1,000 producing wells, 72 flow-stations, 10 gas plants and 2 major oil export terminals (Shell.com 2011).
Shell is only one of six oil companies contracting with the Nigerian government in joint ventures. The Shell Petroleum Development Corporation of Nigeria is a joint venture composed of the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) (55 percent), Shell (30 percent), Elf Aquitaine (10 percent) and AGIP – General Italian Oil Company (5 percent). Elf and AGIP are French and Italian oil companies respectively. The Shell joint venture alone accounts for more than 40 percent of Nigeria’s total oil production (Nigerian National Petroleum Company 2010) with a capacity to produce up to 1 million barrels of oil per day (Shell Petroleum Development Corporation 2010). The second largest producer, Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited, is the only major oil company operating completely offshore; with no onshore production. The company holds over 800,000 acres in shallow water offshore Southeastern Nigeria. Production comes from 90 offshore platforms, with 283 flowing completions in 353 wells with a production capacity of about 720,000 barrels of crude, condensate and natural gas liquid (NGL) per day (ExxonMobil 2010). Chevron Nigeria Limited, the third largest oil producer with approximately 400,000 barrels per day, is a joint venture between the NNPC (60 percent) and U.S. based oil corporation Chevron (40 percent) A fourth joint venture is operated by AGIP (20 percent), Phillips Petroleum (20 percent) and the NNPC (60 percent) and produces 150,000 barrels per day. Elf Petroleum Nigeria Limited is a joint venture between the NNPC (60 percent) and Elf (40 percent) only. In 2005, Elf’s combined oil and gas production totaled 250,000 barrels per day (Total Nigeria 2010). And a final joint venture operated by Texaco and owned by NNPC (60 percent), Texaco (20 percent) and Chevron (20 percent) currently produces about 60,000 barrels per day from five offshore fields (Nigerian National Petroleum Company 2010).
Although oil revenues in Nigeria increased significantly after nationalization of the oil industry, disruptions in the international oil supply occurred due to political events, such as the Arab-Israeli War in 1973 and the Iranian Revolution in 1979, which created a global shortage of oil. Lack of supply as well as increased demand caused the price of oil to increase drastically. High prices led to a drop in demand and increased production creating a surplus of oil on the market. The price of oil peaked in April of 1980 at $39.50 per barrel – $108.32 adjusting for inflation (Mouwad 2008), but then fell below $10 per barrel by the mid-1980s. The Nigerian government, heavily dependent on oil revenues for its income, incurred substantial financial losses.
By 1983, Nigeria had developed a N4 billion trade deficit and applied for a US$2.3 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Anyanwu 1992). In exchange for economic assistance, the IMF required seventeen conditions, known as a structural adjustment program (SAP), to be met that essentially mandated a ‘structural adjustment’ of the Nigerian political economy. Although it was intended to “promote economic efficiency and long-term growth” by “eliminating price distortions, heavy dependence on crude oil exports and imports of consumer and producer goods”, the standardization of such a program instead resulted in severe inflation that caused many other economic and social problems (Anyanwu 1992, 6). The specific structural adjustment policies that Anyanwu is critical of include: external debt management strategies, foreign exchange market operations, removal of petroleum and fertilizer subsidies, trade liberalization, and interest rate deregulation. These particular structural adjustment policies, Anyanwu argues, resulted in income redistribution further exacerbating income inequality, reduced demand for domestic products, and erosion of savings (1992). Therefore, corruption as argued elsewhere in this thesis, is not solely responsible for all Nigeria’s social and economic issues.
Nigeria’s economic history has resulted in oil revenues that currently account for 95 percent of all government revenues. In 2009, Nigeria’s GDP was US$177 billion, three times its 1981 GDP of US$59 billion. GDP was even higher in 2008, at US$219 billion (in current US$), but likely decreased in part due to the global economic recession. Critics argue that the emphasis on oil production led to neglect by the government of the nonoil sectors, such as agriculture and manufacturing, effects of which are explained in chapter four. The agricultural sector has deteriorated to the point where Nigeria is now a net importer of food products instead of an exporter. Access to trillions in oil revenues combined with lack of political accountability has led to a legacy of corruption in Nigeria, one which has had disastrous consequences for its people.
This project was initiated with knowledge of only two traits about Nigeria: that is was located in Africa and that many of its citizens were very poor. The point being that there were no preconceived notions of corruption in Nigeria. Nigeria was not chosen based on any awareness that it was a corrupt nation or a corrupt culture, as is argued in some of the literature, (both assumptions this thesis firmly rejects). Initial interest in this project originated with the paradox between Nigeria’s natural resource wealth and the poverty of its citizens. It was a result of the literature review that a negative overtone between Nigeria and corruption was noticed. Unfortunately, due to limited opportunity for cultural immersion in this study, the information contained herein is the sole result of eleven months worth of researching a wide variety of secondary source material.
This thesis proceeds in the following manner: chapter one has provided the introduction, discussing first the situation in Nigeria, and then presented the political and economic histories, followed by the thesis overview. Chapter two addresses research limitations within the study including data scarcity and reliability, difficulties with the conceptualization and measurement of corruption, in addition to defining and operationalizing social welfare. Chapter three will present a literature review attempting to focus more on contemporary corruption in Nigeria since its transition from decades of military rule. The fourth chapter deals with the findings of the research, which is the impact of corruption on the different aspects of social welfare, categorized according to the impact of each component of social welfare, to include poverty, inequality, infrastructure, and revenue allocation. The section on infrastructure encompasses electricity, education, environment, crime, and economic sectors of societal infrastructure. Chapter five entails the conclusion, including the failure of anti-corruption efforts to date, the international aspects of corruption, and suggestions for future research.
 Nigeria also has large reserves of natural gas that have yet to be fully harnessed. Their economy is still far more dependent on oil production.
 GDP prior to 1981 could not be located.
THE EFFECT OF BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA SOCIETY